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2025, 06, v.34 33-39
塞尔的意向性因果理论对休谟传统因果理论的突破及其自我辩护
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摘要:

意向性和因果性是当代西方哲学和认知科学关注的重要话题,对于二者的关系学界一般认为意向性不具备因果性,因果性的解释也不是意向性的。塞尔的意向性因果理论是意向实在论自然主义进路的重要代表,它将意向性和因果性联系起来,力图弥补以休谟为代表的传统因果理论的不足。虽然此理论遭到了不少学者的质疑,但是首次承认意向性不是一个超越的概念,意向状态通过大脑神经活动对行为的因果作用得以体现,为心灵世界和物理世界联系搭建了桥梁。同时塞尔提出的新因果性概念不仅丰富了因果理论本身,也为哲学与认知科学在心灵现象中的跨学科对话提供了有效范式。

Abstract:

Intentionality and causality are important topics in contemporary Western philosophy and cognitive science. In academic circles,it is generally believed that intentionality does not have casual efficacy and the explanation of causality is not intentional in nature regarding their relationship. Searle's causal theory of intentionality stands as a prominent representative of the naturalistic approach to intentional realism. It connects intentionality with causality,aiming to make up for the deficiency of the traditional causal theory represented by Hume. Although this theory has been questioned by a number of scholars,it is the first time to recognize that intentionality is not a transcendent concept,and that intentional states are manifested through the causal effects of brain neural activities on behavior,thereby building a bridge between the mental world and the physical world. Meanwhile,the new concept of causality proposed by Searle not only enriches the causal theory itself,but also provides an effective paradigm for an interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and cognitive science in the study of mental phenomena.

参考文献

[1]约翰·塞尔.意向性——论心灵哲学(修订译本)[M].刘叶涛,冯立荣,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2019.

[2]李珍.意向性与因果性——基于干预主义因果论进路的意向因果性的研究[J].科学技术与辩证法,2009(2):101-105.

[3]李珍.意向性的自然化路径探析——对塞尔生物自然主义立场的考察[J].现代哲学,2014(4):71-76.

[4]Thompson D L. Intentionality and causality in John Searle[J]. Canadian Journal of Philosophy,1986,16(1):83-97.

[5]李珍.意向性与因果性[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社,2020.

[6]约翰·塞尔.心灵导论[M].徐英瑾,译.上海:上海人民出版社,2019.

基本信息:

中图分类号:B561.291;B712.59

引用信息:

[1]廖维玉,成官泯.塞尔的意向性因果理论对休谟传统因果理论的突破及其自我辩护[J].淮阴工学院学报,2025,34(06):33-39.

投稿时间:

2025-03-30

投稿日期(年):

2025

终审时间:

2025-07-07

终审日期(年):

2025

审稿周期(年):

1

发布时间:

2025-12-15

出版时间:

2025-12-15

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